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THE ROAD TO JUDICIAL ABOLISHMENT OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE HAS BEEN 
PAVED BY BOZMAN V. BOZMAN! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite vast criticism and overwhelming dissent by almost all of the 
states, Maryland remains one of only five jurisdictions that still recog-
nizes contributory negligence.2 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
justified Maryland's status as a contributory negligence jurisdiction 
with its decision in Hamson v. Montgomery County Board of Education to 
defer abrogation to the legislature. 3 The legislature's failure to act in 
the twenty years since this decision has created a need to reexamine 
judicial abrogation. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has reserved the abrogation of 
many common law doctrines for the legislature.4 Prior to 2003, the 
court used this justification to preserve the interspousal immunity 
doctrine in a line of cases beginning in 1952.5 In Bozman v. Bozman,6 
however, the court recognized interspousal immunity's deficiencies 
and abolished the doctrine. 7 In reexamining its previous deference to 
the legislature, the Court of Appeals identified the interspousal immu-
nity doctrine as "an antiquated rule of law which, in our view, runs 
counter to prevailing societal norms and, therefore, has lived out its 
usefulness."8 
A similar rationale can be applied to Maryland's contributory negli-
gence doctrine. Contributory negligence is an antiquated doctrine 
abolished by almost all of the states9 and common law countries, in-
1. 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003). 
2. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
3. See 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 894, 905 (1983). 
4. See, e.g., State v. Sowell, 353 Md. 713, 728 A.2d 712 (1999) (distinction be-
tween principals and accessories); Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 
51,415 A.2d 255 (1979) (governmental immunity); Creaser v. Owens, 267 
Md. 238, 297 A.2d 235 (1972) (the "boulevard rule"); Howard v. Bishop 
Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 863 (1968) (charitable 
immunity); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966) (lex loci delicti). 
5. See generally Stokes v. Ass'n of Indep. Taxi Operators, Inc., 248 Md. 690,237 
A.2d 762 (1968); Hudson v. Hudson, 226 Md. 521, 174 A.2d 339 (1961); 
Fernandez v. Fernandez, 214 Md. 519, 135 A.2d 886 (1957); Gregg v. 
Gregg, 199 Md. 662, 87 A.2d 581 (1952). 
6. 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003). 
7. See id. at 496, 830 A.2d at 471. 
8. Id. at 467-68, 830 A.2d at 454. 
9. See Christopher J. Robinette & Paul G. Sherland, Contributory or Comparative: 
Which Is the Optimal Negligence Rule?, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41, 44-45 (2003). 
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eluding England, where it originated. 1O Efforts in Maryland to pass a 
comparative negligence bill in the legislature have failed. II It is time 
to reevaluate the court's role. Judicial action is necessary, and is the 
next logical step in abolishing contributory negligence in Maryland. 
This comment will first examine the origins of contributory and 
comparative negligence. 12 It will then demonstrate how the ruling in 
Bozman reflects willingness by the Court of Appeals to abrogate anti-
quated doctrines, the abolition of which it previously deferred to the 
legislature. I3 Finally, it will suggest a form of comparative negligence 
for the Court of Appeals of Maryland to adopt. 14 
II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
A. The Origins oj Contributory Negligence 
The concept of contributory negligence originated in an 1806 En-
glish case, Butterfield v. Forrester. I5 Butterfield was injured when his 
horse struck a pole that Forrester had left in the road. I6 Because the 
jury found that Butterfield had been riding too fast to see and avoid 
the obstruction, the court denied recovery.I7 Lord Ellenborough 
stated, "One person being in fault will not dispense with another's 
using ordinary care for himself. Two things must concur to support 
this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, 
and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff."18 
This concept was said to have developed from a judge-perceived 
need to control plaintiff-minded juries.19 In addition, courts sought 
remain contributory negligence jurisdictions. Id. at 45 n.27, 56. See also in-
fra Part III. 
10. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.w.2d 511,515 (Mich. 1979). En-
gland replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence in the 
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Ceo. 6, ch. 28 
(Eng.). 
11. See infra Part III.C.2. 
12. Infra Parts II, III. 
13. Infra Parts IV,V. 
14. Infra Part VI. 
15. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (KB. 1809). See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of 
Educ., 295 Md. 442, 449, 456 A.2d 894,897 (1983). 
16. Butterfield, 103 Eng. Rep. at 926. 
17. Id. at 926-27. 
18. Id. 
19. Joseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Propar-
tional Liability, 41 ALA. L. REv. 13,20 (1989). One commentator explained 
the origin of "plaintiff-minded juries": 
When simple disputes between neighbors had formed the bulk of 
tort litigation, as had been the case in the past, jurors had been 
able to dispose of such cases easily, fairly, and properly. When, 
however, big and remote corporate defendants, especially rail-
roads, entered the scene, the average juror, often regarding such 
defendants to be intruders as well as immensely rich, became plain-
tiff-minded. 
2004] Judicial Abolishment of Contributory Negligence 267 
to limit the liability of newly developing industry.20 Several underly-
ing policies also existed, including "punishment of the negligent 
plaintiff, encouragement to comply with the community's standard of 
care, and the alleged inability of juries to measure the amount of dam-
age attributable to the plaintiffs own negligence."21 Mter being first 
recognized in the United States in Smith v. Smith in 1824,22 contribu-
tory negligence was later adopted by all of the states and the District 
of Columbia.23 
B. Contributory Negligence in Maryland 
In 1847, Maryland adopted the doctrine of contributory negligence 
in Irwin v. Sprigg.24 Then, in 1966, Maryland adopted the Second Re-
statement of Torts' definition of contributory negligence in Craig v. 
Greenbelt Consumer Services, Inc. 25 It defined contributory negligence as 
"conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to 
which he should conform for his own protection, and which is a le-
gally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the de-
fendant in bringing about the plaintiffs harm."26 Therefore, if a 
plaintiffs own negligence contributed to his injuries, he could recover 
nothing from the defendant. 
C. Efforts to Ameliorate the Harshness of Contributory Negligence 
Contributory negligence has been highly criticized for its unfairness 
to plaintiffs, arising from the doctrine's ability to relieve a defendant 
of liability for even the smallest degree of fault by the plaintiff.27 
States that have judicially abrogated the doctrine have recognized its 
harsh nature.28 For example, in Hoffman v. jones,29 the Supreme 
Ernest A. Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
189, 198-99 (1950). 
20. Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 897. But see Steven Gardner, Contribu-
tory Negligence, Comparative Negligence, and Stare Decisis in North Carolina, 18 
CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 12 (1996) (arguing that the theory "that a particular 
court adopted a particular legal doctrine because of the court's unspoken 
desire to assist the industrial revolution is pure speculation"). 
21. Harrison, 295 Md. at 450, 456 A.2d at 898. 
22. 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). 
23. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 41. 
24. See 6 Gill 200, 205 (Md. 1847). 
25. 244 Md. 95, 97, 222 A.2d 836, 837 (1966). 
26. Id. 
27. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 465, 456 
A.2d 894, 906 (1983) (Davidson, j., dissenting). 
28. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) ("[TJhe contribu-
tory negligence rule yields unfair results which can no longer be justi-
fied."); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1241 (N.M. 1981) ("The predominant 
argument for its abandonment rests, of course, upon the undeniable ineq-
uity and injustice in casting an entire accidental loss upon a plaintiff whose 
negligence combined with another's negligence in causing the loss suf-
fered, no matter how trifling plaintiffs negligence might be."). 
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Court of Florida noted that the underlying principles of the doctrine 
no longer justifY its unfairness to a negligent plaintiff.30 In her dissent 
in Harrison, judge Davidson, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, rec-
ognized this unfairness: 
I am not convinced that in Maryland, society's concept of 
fairness differs in any significant degree from the concept of 
fairness shared in all of those common law and civil law juris-
dictions throughout the world that have abandoned the doc-
trine of contributory negligence in favor of the doctrine of 
comparative negligence. I am convinced that in Maryland, 
as elsewhere, the doctrine of contributory negligence has be-
come unsound under the circumstances of modern life.31 
Prior to the development of comparative negligence, courts made 
several efforts to lessen the harshness of contributory negligence. Ex-
amples of such ameliorative efforts include the last clear chance doc-
trine, the safety statute exception, and the greater-degree-of-blame 
exception.32 All three exceptions provide recovery for plaintiffs, even 
if they are contributorily negligent.33 
In 1868, Maryland adopted the last clear chance doctrine,34 al-
lowing recovery by a plaintiff, who would otherwise be denied recov-
ery, if the defendant had the last chance to avoid the accident.35 The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland denied assertions that the adoption of 
the last clear chance doctrine "indicate[d] any general dissatisfaction 
with the contributory negligence doctrine."36 Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, viewed the last clear chance doctrine as a means to lessen the 
harshness of contributory negligence.37 Despite the adoption of these 
29. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). 
30. Id. at 436. 
31. Harrison, 295 Md. at 465-66, 456 A.2dat 906 (Davidson, j., dissenting). 
32. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 41. 
33. See id. at 41-42. The safety statute exception provides recovery "if the defen-
dant's negligence consisted of the breach of a statute specifically designed 
to protect a class of persons unable to protect themselves against defen-
dant's negligence." ld. The greater-degree-of-blame exception provides re-
covery "if the defendant's conduct was 'intentional' or 'reckless.''' Id. at 42. 
Finally, the last clear chance doctrine applies if the "defendant had the last 
clear chance to avoid harming the plaintiff." Id. 
34. N. Cent. Ry. v. State, 29 Md. 420, 43&-37 (1868). 
35. Edward S. Digges, Jr. & Robert Dale Klein, Comparative Fault in Maryland: 
The Time Has Come, 41 MD. L. REv. 227, 278 (1982). 
36. Harrison, 295 Md. at 451,456 A.2d at 898. 
37. See, e.g., Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098, 1106 (N.M. 2003) 
(stating that doctrines such as last clear chance "existed as judicial escape 
mechanisms to avoid the sometimes harsh results of contributory negli-
gence"); Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584,588 (W.Va. 1981) ("[TJhe doc-
trine of last clear chance was a judicial development to modifY the 
harshness of the contributory negligence rule."). 
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exceptions, the unfairness of the doctrine prevailed and many states 
began to seek an alternative measure-comparative negligence.38 
III. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 
A. The Origins of the Comparative Negligence Doctrine 
In 1858, Illinois became the first state to experiment with compara-
tive negligence.39 This experiment failed and Illinois courts returned 
to contributory negligence twenty-seven years later.4o In 1981, how-
ever, the Supreme Court of Illinois readopted comparative 
negligence.41 
In the 1860s, Georgia became the first state to permanently adopt 
comparative negligence.42 Using language from previous cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the state legislature enacted 
two statutes.43 One dealt strictly with negligent railroad operations, 
while the other stated more broadly that a defendant would not be 
relieved from liability simply because of the plaintiffs negligence.44 
The first federal acknowledgment of comparative negligence oc-
curred in 1908 when Congress enacted the second Federal Employers' 
Liability Act (FELA), which eliminated the previous bar to recovery 
for employees of common carriers whose negligence contributed to 
the accident.45 The damages were diminished in proportion to the 
amount of an employee's negligence.46 Only six states adopted com-
parative negligence statutes over the next sixty years. 47 During the 
late 1960s and 1970s, however, states began to adopt comparative neg-
ligence at a more rapid pace.48 As of 2005, forty-six states have re-
placed contributory negligence with comparative negligence.49 
38. See infra Part III. 
39. See Galena & Chicago Union RR v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478 (1858). 
40. See Calumet Iron & Steel Co. v. Martin, 3 N.E. 456 (Ill. 1885); see also Alvis v. 
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ill. 1981). 
41. Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 898. 
42. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 42-43. 
43. [d. at 42; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 4~291 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-11-7 
(2000). 
44. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 42-43. 
45. Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149,35 Stat. 66 (codified as amended 
at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000»; Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43. 
46. See 45 U.S.C. § 53. 
47. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-
122 (Michie Supp. 2003) (originally enacted in 1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 14, § 156 (West 2003) (enacted in 1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 
(1999) (enacted in 1910); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1995) (enacted in 
1913); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie Supp. 2003) (enacted in 1941); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997) (enacted in 1931). 
48. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43. 
49. [d. 
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B. Types of Comparative Negligence 
There are two main types of comparative negligence: pure and 
modified. Pure comparative negligence requires each party to pay his 
or her proportion of the damages. 50 Fourteen states have adopted the 
pure form. 51 The majority of states that judicially adopted compara-
tive negligence chose the pure form. 52 
Modified comparative negligence exists in the remaining compara-
tive negligence states.53 There are three approaches to modified com-
parative negligence: the fifty percent rule, the forty-nine percent rule, 
and the slight/gross rule.54 The fifty percent rule, used in twenty-one 
jurisdictions,55 allows a plaintiff to recover if his or her negligence was 
not greater than fifty percent of the plaintiff's and defendant's negli-
gence combined.56 Similarly, the forty-nine percent rule, followed by 
50. See Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981). 
51. Ar..AsKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505 
(West 2003); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 768.31 (West Supp. 2004); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West 1997); ME. 
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 
(1999); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1997); R.1. GEN. LAws § 9-20-4 
(1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.005 (West 2004); Hilen v. Hays, 673 
S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 
511,519-20 (Mich. 1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.w.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 
1983); Scott, 634 P.2d at 1242. 
52. Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 719. Nine of the twelve states that judicially adopted 
comparative negligence adopted the pure form. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 
1037,1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226,1243 
(Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. 
Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 
742, 754 (Iowa 1982); Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 719; Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 519-
20; Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15-16; Scott, 634 P.2d at 1242. The legislatures 
of Illinois and Iowa, however, have since enacted modified comparative 
negligence statutes. See 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998). 
53. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 43-44. 
54. [d. 
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 8132 (1999); HAw. REv. STAT. § 663-31 (1993); 735 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6 (Michie 
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
231, § 85 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 2000); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 27-1-702 (2003); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41.141 (Michie 2002); 
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-d (1997); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 
2000); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.22 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
23, § 13-14 (West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 31.600 (2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
§§ 33.001-33.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2004-2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 1036 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
1-109 (Michie 2003); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 
(S.C. 1991). 
56. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 44. These laws generally state that a 
plaintiff may recover if his or her negligence is "not greater than" that of 
the defendant. [d. 
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ten states,57 prohibits recovery if the plaintiff was more than forty-nine 
percent negligent.58 Under the slight/gross rule, a plaintiff can only 
recover if he or she is slightly negligent, or if the defendant is grossly 
negligent relative to plaintiff's negligence.59 This form is used only in 
South Dakota.60 
Michigan created an exception to these forms in adopting a hybrid 
of pure and modified comparative negligence.61 Michigan's compara-
tive negligence statute provides that if a party is more than fifty per-
cent negligent, they are entitled to economic damages proportionate 
to their fault, but are not entitled to noneconomic damages.62 
C. Judicial vs. Legislative Adoption 
Of the forty-six comparative negligence states, twelve states judi-
cially adopted comparative negligence. 63 These decisions have oc-
curred even in states in which the courts initially deferred such a 
change to the legislature.64 Although legislatures in two of those 
states subsequently enacted statutes that changed the form of com par-
57. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-122 (Michie Supp. 2003); COLO. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-21-111 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-11-7, 51-12-33 (2000); 
IDAHO CODE § tHl01 (Michie 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, 60-258b 
(1994); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185.09 (Michie 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 32-03.2-02 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-38, 78-27-40 (2002); McIn-
tyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52,57 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian 
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W. Va. 1979); Robinette & Sherland, supra 
note 9, at 45 n.29. 
58. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 44. These laws generally allow a 
plaintiff to recover if his or her negligence is "not as great as" the defen-
dant's. Id. 
59. !d. 
60. Id. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-9-2 (Michie Supp. 2003). 
61. Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45. See MICH. CaMP. LAws ANN. 
§§ 600.2958, 600.2959 (West 2000). Michigan's statute provides: 
In an action based on tort ... the court shall reduce the damages 
by the percentage of comparative fault of the person upon whose 
injury or death the damages are based .... If that person's per-
centage of fault is greater than the aggregate fault of the other 
person or persons, whether or not parties to the action, the court 
shall reduce economic damages by the percentage of comparative 
fault of the person upon whose injury or death the damages are 
based ... and noneconomic damages shall not be awarded. 
Id. § 600.2959 (West 2000). 
62. See Id. § 600.2959. 
63. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Hoffman v.Jones, 280 
So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Ill. 1981); 
Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Iowa 1982); Hilen v. Hays, 673 
S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 
511,514 (Mich. 1979); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1983); 
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234, 1236 (N.M. 1981); Nelson v. Concrete Supply 
Co., 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 
53 (Tenn. 1992); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 
1979); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Cal. 1975). 
64. See infra Part IV.B.2.b. 
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ative negligence from pure to modified, they agreed with the courts' 
decision to replace contributory negligence with comparative 
negligence.65 
1. The Rationale for Judicial Adoption 
The decisions of the judicially acting courts follow similar ratio-
nales. Their primary support for judicial action is the judicial origin 
of contributory negligence.66 In Tennessee, for example, the court 
stated, "We recognize that this action could be taken by our General 
Assembly. However, legislative inaction has never prevented judicial 
abolition of obsolete common law doctrines, especially those, such as 
contributory negligence, conceived in the judicial womb."67 
Other rationales have also been used to support judicial action. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan examined both the strengths and 
potential weaknesses of judicial action, in effect summarizing the justi-
fication of many of the judicially acting states.68 The court acknowl-
edged the arguments in favor of legislative action, but provided an 
equally strong, if not stronger, argument in favor of judicial action.69 
The court stated: . 
First is the question which of these two bodies is better 
equipped to understand the nature and implications of the 
problem and to make an informed choice from available al-
ternatives. It is fashionable to suppose that the investigatory 
opportunities of the legislature establish its superior creden-
tials in this respect. . .. But on the question of contributory negli-
gence, one cannot very well dispute the unique judicial experience 
and preoccupation . ... In a nutshell, this is preeminently law-
yer's law.70 
The Supreme Court of Michigan further supported judicial action 
in stating th~t most statutes are too concise, and thus create questions 
that the courts must later resolve?l Courts, unlike legislatures, have 
65. See 735 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 668.3 (West 1998). 
66. See, e.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049 (stating that "increasing [sic] it is perceived 
that a rule which is judicial in origin can be, and appropriately should be, 
altered by the institution which was its creator"); Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 895 
(citing previous cases that "found that contributory negligence is a judi-
cially created doctrine which can be altered or totally replaced by the court 
which created it"); Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 517 (stating that "when dealing 
with judge-made law, this Court in the past has not disregarded its correc-
tive responsibility in the proper case"). 
67. McIntyre, 833 S.W.2d at 56. 
68. Placek, 275 N.W.2d at 517-19. 
69. Id. at 518. 
70. Id. (quoting John C. Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-By 
Judicial Choice, 64 CAL. L. REv. 239, 279-80 (1976». 
71. Id. (citing Fleming, supra note 70, at 281). In recognizing this need for 
subsequent court action, the Alaska Supreme Court noted: 
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the ability to foresee these potential issues and can therefore address 
such questions before they are actually brought before the court. 
Although strong arguments exist in favor of legislative action, many 
courts have both recognized the importance of and supported judicial 
action. As demonstrated by the twelve courts that have already acted, 
judicial abrogation is a well-supported course of action in the abolish-
ment of contributory negligence. 
2. Maryland's Preference for Legislative Action 
Deference to the legislature in Maryland is primarily attributed to 
public policy: 
[W] e are unable to say that the circumstances of modern life 
has so changed as to render contributory negligence a ves-
tige of the past, no longer suitable to the needs of the people 
of Maryland. In the final analysis, whether to abandon the 
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative 
negligence involves fundamental and basic public policy con-
siderations properly to be addressed by the legislature.72 
Each year between 1996 and 2002, Maryland legislators introduced 
comparative negligence bills in the House or Senate.73 The General 
Assembly has failed to enact any of them. In her dissent in Harrison, 
Judge Davidson pointed out that "[t]his Court has repeatedly held 
that the Legislature's failure to enact legislation is a 'weak reed upon 
which to lean' in drawing a positive inference of legislative intent.,,74 
Instead, there may be other explanations for the legislature's failure 
Our adoption of this new principle does not, of course, end our 
judicial tasks in this area. Subsidiary questions and problems con-
cerning the relationship of the new rule to other doctrines of tort 
law must necessarily be adjudicated in the future. We must, for the 
most part, await future cases for the further development of law in 
this field. 
Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049-50. 
72. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 463, 456 A.2d 
894,905 (1983). 
73. H.D. 836, 1996 Leg., 410th Sess. (Md. 1996) (withdrawn); H.D. 846, 1997 
Leg., 411th Sess. (Md. 1997) (receiving an unfavorable report from House 
Judiciary Committee); S. 618, 1998 Leg., 412th Sess. (Md. 1998) (receiving 
an unfavorable report from Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); H.D. 
551, 1999 Leg., 413th Sess. (Md. 1999) (receiving an unfavorable report 
from the House Judiciary Committee); S. 779, 2000 Leg., 414th Sess. (Md. 
2000) (receiving an unfavorable report from the Senate Judicial Proceed-
ings Committee); S. 483, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001) (receiving an 
unfavorable report from the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee); S. 
872, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002) (no action). 
74. Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 906 (Davidson, j., dissenting) (citing 
Auto. Trade Ass'n of Md., Inc. v. Ins. Comm'r of Md., 292 Md. 15, 24, 437 
A.2d 199, 203 (1981); Harden v. Mass Transit Admin., 277 Md. 399, 406, 
354 A.2d 817, 820-21 (1976)). 
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to act.75 For example, Judge Davidson suggested that the legislature's 
failure to create an effective comparative negligence statute may be 
the result of insufficient bills.76 There are many collateral issues asso-
ciated with the adoption of comparative negligence, and a statute that 
does not address these issues may be viewed as ineffective.77 In addi-
tion, the legislature may deem doctrinal change more appropriate for 
the court to evaluate on a case-by-case basis.78 Judge Davidson empha-
sized, "[LJegislative inaction here does not constitute an impediment 
to abrogation of the doctrine of contributory negligence by judicial 
decision."79 
IV. TIME FOR A CHANGE 
Maryland's reluctance to judicially abolish contributory negligence 
was specifically articulated in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of 
Education.80 According to the Court of Appeals, contributory negli-
gence is a "fundamental principle of Maryland negligence law, one 
deeply imbedded in the common law of this State."81 The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland observed that Maryland case law does not indi-
cate dissatisfaction with contributory negligence, and a societal need 
to abrogate the doctrine did not exist in Maryland; however, it is al-
most universally considered antiquated and outdated with respect to 
modern concepts of tort law. 82 
The doctrine of interspousal immunity is similarly an antiquated 
common law doctrine, but it was ultimately abrogated by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland. An analysis of the court's rationale in Bozman v. 
Bozman, therefore, is useful in demonstrating the court's willingness to 
judicially abrogate such a common law doctrine when it is no longer 
deemed useful. 
A. The Abrogation of Interspousal Immunity 
Interspousal immunity developed out of the concept that a husband 
and wife were one entity.83 The Married Women's Act of 1898 
75. Id. (citing Police Comm'r of Bait. v. Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420-21, 379 A.2d 
1007, 1012 (1977); Hearst Corp. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 
269 Md. 625, 644, 308 A.2d 679, 689 (1973)). 
76. See id. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907. Senate Bill 872 of 2002 succinctly stated that 
contributory negligence may not bar a recovery, that damages are to be 
"diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the 
plaintiff," and that the effect of the statute is prospective. See S. 872, 2002 
Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002). 
77. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907. 
78. Harrison, 295 Md. at 466, 456 A.2d at 907. 
79. Id. 
80. 295 Md. 442, 456 A.2d 894 (1983). 
81. Id. at 458, 456 A.2d at 902. 
82. Id.; see infra Part IV.B.l. 
83. See Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 244, 462 A.2d 506, 507 (1983) (stating 
that '''[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law .... 
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changed this view by granting married women certain rights indepen-
dent of their marriage.84 The Supreme Court explained, however, 
that this Act did not extend to interspousal immunity, stating that 
"[t]he statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the 
husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions 
of tort which, at common law, must be brought in the joint names of 
herself and husband."85 Those opposed to the abrogation of inter-
spousal immunity argued that abrogation would disrupt the peace and 
tranquility of marriage and encourage fraudulent claims.86 Changes 
in society, however, led the courts to question these justifications. For 
example, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky stated in Brown v. Gossel'7 
that "[t]he fear that relaxation of the common law rule will open the 
door to fraudulent and fictitious claims, especially against insurance 
companies, has less force than the argument of 'domestic peace and 
£' 1" , "88 J.e ICity. 
Maryland also began to question the validity of interspousal immu-
nity. In Lusby v. Lusby,89 the Court of Appeals created a narrow excep-
tion to interspousal immunity.90 This exception was later defined as 
one that abrogates immunity "whenever the tort committed against 
the spousal victim is not only intentional, as in assault and battery, but 
'outrageous,' as where the errant spouse's conduct transcends com-
mon decency and accepted practices."91 
In 1983, the Court of Appeals took the next step toward the full 
abrogation of inters po usa 1 immunity in Boblitz v. Boblitz,92 holding that 
the doctrine could not be applied in negligence cases.93 The court, 
after examining the rationale of other interspousal immunity states, 
cited the prevention of an increase in trivial claims and the need for 
Upon this principle, of a union of person in husband and wife, depend 
almost all the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them ac-
quire by the marriage."') (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*430). 
84. See Married Women's Act, 1898 Md. Laws 457 (current version at MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-204 (1999)). The Act provided that "[m]arried women 
shall have power ... to sue ... for torts committed against them, as fully as 
if they were unmarried." [d. 
85. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617 (1910). 
86. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 255-57, 462 A,2d at 512-13. 
87. 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953). 
88. [d. at 484. The Supreme Court of Arizona also questioned such arguments: 
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity cannot be supported by 
an antiquated and narrow 'unity' doctrine that perpetuates the fic-
tion of female disability if not inferiority. Whatever logic the unity 
doctrine had in times gone by, it cannot operate today as a reason 
for supporting the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. 
Fernandez v. Romo, 646 P.2d 878, 881 (Ariz. 1982). 
89. 283 Md. 334, 390 A,2d 77 (1978). 
90. [d. at 357-58, 390 A,2d at 88-89. 
91. Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 664, 420 A,2d 1249, 1251 (1980). 
92. 296 Md. 242, 462 A,2d 506 (1983). 
93. [d. at 275, 462 A,2d at 522. 
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legislative action among the six reasons for retention of the doc-
trine.94 Mter analyzing the rationale of states that have abrogated the 
doctrine, the court found "no reasonable basis" or "subsisting public 
policy" justifYing abrogation of the doctrine.95 
In the years following Boblitz, the court continued to defer any ac-
tion regarding full abrogation to the legislature. Twenty years after 
Boblitz, however, the court judicially abolished interspousal immunity 
in Bozman v. Bozman.96 In reaching this holding, the court considered 
many factors, including its right to judicially change common law doc-
trines.97 Although the court had repeatedly declined to judicially ab-
rogate interspousal immunity, the Bozman court determined that the 
need for change far outweighed any concerns of stare decisis.98 
B. The Effect of Bozman v. Bozman and Its Parallels to Contributory 
Negligence 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bozman found that inter-
spousal immunity was no longer justified by its common law founda-
tion.99 The court looked to other jurisdictions and secondary 
authority for support of this conclusion. Only four other states still 
retained the doctrine.lOo The court recognized the weight of author-
ity against interspousal immunity, stating that "the trend [since Bob-
litz] toward abrogation having continued and the weight of authority 
having grown larger, we are fortified in that view [in favor of abroga-
tion] ."101 In examining the rationale of Bozman, specifically, the abol-
ishment of antiquated common law doctrines, other states' decisions, 
and secondary authority, one can gain greater insight as to why the 
court would judicially abrogate a common law doctrine. 
1. The Abolishment of Antiquated Common Law Doctrines 
As times change and society progresses, courts amend common law 
doctrines to conform to current situations. Often, these doctrines are 
94. Id. at 256-57,462 A.2d at 513. These two reasons are also cited for retaining 
contributory negligence. Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 
295 Md. 442,455-56, 456 A.2d 894, 900-01 (1983). The other reasons for 
retention were "[t]he unity of husband and wife," "[i]nterspousal tort ac-
tions will destroy the harmony of the marital relationship," [r]etention of 
the doctrine will prevent collusive and fraudulent claims," and" [d]ivorce 
and criminal courts furnish adequate redress." Id. 
95. See Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521. 
96. 376 Md. 461, 497, 830 A.2d 450, 471 (2003). 
97. Id. at 483-85, 830 A.2d at 463-64. 
98. Id. at 493-95,830 A.2d at 469-70. The court stated that "it is eminently wise 
of this Court to abrogate a doctrine that is 'a vestige of the past [and] no 
longer suitable to our people.'" Id. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Respondent'S Brief). 
99. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466. 
100. Id. at 487, 830 A.2d at 466. 
101. Id. at 488, 830 A.2d at 466. 
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abolished because they have become essentially useless. This ratio-
nale was articulated by the court in Bozman and can also be said of 
contributory negligence. 102 
In adopting comparative negligence, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia emphasized the unfairness of the doctrine as it relates to today's 
society: 
It is unnecessary for us to catalogue the enormous amount 
of critical comment that has been directed over the years 
against the 'all-or-nothing' approach of the doctrine of con-
tributory negligence. The essence of that criticism has been 
constant and clear: the doctrine is inequitable in its opera-
tion because it fails to distribute responsibility in proportion 
to fault. Against this have been raised several arguments in 
justification, but none have proved even remotely adequate 
to the task. The basic objection to the doctrine-grounded 
in the primal concept that in a system in which liability is 
based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent 
of liability-remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent 
notions of fairness. 103 
Retaining contributory negligence, therefore, is no longer justified by 
the policies upon which it was developed. This fundamental unfair-
ness has led forty-six states to abolish this antiquated doctrine. 
2. The Influence of Other States' Decisions 
In identifying the influence of other states' decisions, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in Bozman stated that although not binding, 
these decisions may be used as persuasive authority.104 
In Bozman, the court analyzed the decisions of other states since its 
previous decision in Boblitz, and noted that the vast majority of states 
had abrogated the doctrine. lOS Specifically, the court observed that 
judicial abrogation occurred in nine of the twelve states that recog-
nized interspousal immunity at the time of Boblitz.106 One did so by 
statute, and the other two abrogated the doctrine in part.107 
In the contributory negligence context, since Harrison, seven addi-
tional states changed to comparative negligence. lOS Four of these 
102. Id. at 467-68, 830 A.2d at 454. 
103. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Cal. 1975). 
104. Bozman, 376 Md. at 490, 830 A.2d at 467. 
105. Id. at 487, 830 A.2d at 465. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456 n.10, 
456 A.2d 894, 901 n.10 (1983) (listing states that retained contributory neg-
ligence at that time); see also ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2505, 12-2509 
(West 2003) (enacted in 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8132 (1999) (en-
acted in 1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-2-5, 34-51-2-6 (Michie 1998) (en-
acted in 1998); Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 720 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. 
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states did so judicially,109 one of which-Missouri-initially deferred 
action to the legislature.110 
As with interspousal tort immunity, the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions should be persuasive. It is therefore important to compare the 
rationales of contributory negligence states with those in which it has 
been judicially abrogated. 
a. Contributory Negligence Jurisdictions 
Only Maryland, Alabama, North Carolina, Virginia, and the District 
of Columbia remain contributory negligence jurisdictions. 1 11 These 
jurisdictions recognize the antiquated nature of the doctrine, but con-
tinue to apply it in their courts. The Court of Appeals of North Caro-
lina, for example, acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's 
classification of contributory negligence as "discredited" in their deci-
sion to retain the doctrineY2 Associate Judge Farrell of the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals stated in a concurring opinion that "the 
more I participate in decisions applying the doctrines of negligence, 
contributory negligence and last clear chance, the more I am per-
suaded that serious thought should be given to adopting some form of 
comparative negligence in this jurisdiction."1l3 
In Alabama, a state similarly struggling with the decision of whether 
to abolish contributory negligence, Justice Jones's dissenting opinion 
expressed many of the problems encountered with such a standard. 114 
He recognized that "UJurors tend to find themselves caught between 
the judge's instruction on contributory negligence and their own 
common concepts of the logical link between fault and liability."115 
Therefore, contributory negligence creates two extreme choiCes for 
the jury: either to award the plaintiff the damages they sought, or to 
Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1983); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 
S.E.2d 783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 
(Tenn. 1992). 
109. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
110. See Hamson, 295 Md. at 456,456 A.2d at 901; see also Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d 
at 15. 
111. See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9. The Court of Appeals of North 
Carolina maintains that "[a]lthough forty-six states have abandoned the 
doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence, 
contributory negligence continues to be the law of this State until our Su-
preme Court overrules it or the General Assembly adopts comparative neg-
ligence." Alford v. Lowery, 573 S.E.2d 543, 546 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
(quoting Jones v. Rochelle, 479 S.E.2d 231,235 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997». 
112. Bosley v. Alexander, 442 S.E.2d 82, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Pope 
& Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953». 
113. District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C. 1994) (Farrell, 
j., concurring). 
114. See Golden v. McCurry, 392 So. 2d 815, 820-22 (Ala. 1~80) (jones, j., 
dissenting) . 
115. Id. at 821. 
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prevent the plaintiff from collecting damages as a result of their negli-
gence, however slight it may bey6 
The courts of these states, however, refuse to act, most awaiting leg-
islative action. The Supreme Court of Alabama, for example, ac-
knowledged the criticism by both legal scholars and judges who have 
abolished the doctrine, but maintained that such action is solely for 
the legisiatureY7 This deference to the legislature is often criticized 
in concurring and dissenting opinions. In a dissenting opinion, Chief 
Justice Hornsby of the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized that 
"[j]udicial adoption of the comparative negligence analysis may be-
come necessary due to the continuing legislative inertia on this sub-
ject."1l8 Judge Farrell of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
addressed similar concerns in stating that "assuming [legislative 
change] does not take place, then the judges of this court should take 
a hard look at whether there are not more rational principles by 
which to resolve these cases in which so often the fault of both parties 
is obvious to judges as well as juries."1l9 
Although these courts share Maryland's reluctance to judicially ab-
rogate the doctrine, forty-six other states, twelve of which judicially 
abrogated the doctrine, demonstrate that the antiquated nature of 
contributory negligence far outweighs any concerns relating to judi-
cial action. 
b. Judicially Abrogated Jurisdictions 
At the time of Hamson, eight state supreme courts had judicially 
adopted comparative negligence.12o In Florida, the first state to judi-
cially adopt comparative negligence, the court examined its own 
power to replace contributory negligence. It had been previously sug-
gested that only the legislature held this power. 121 In determining 
that it could adopt comparative negligence, the court emphasized that 
contributory negligence is "a judicial creation" and was "specifically 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 817. 
118. Campbell v. Ala. Power Co., 567 So. 2d 1222, 1229 (Ala. 1990) (Hornsby, 
Cj., dissenting) (quoting Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 
381 n.8 (Ala. 1989)). 
119. District of Columbia v. Huysman, 650 A.2d 1323, 1328 (D.C. 1994) (Farrell, 
j., concurring). 
120. See Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 456, 456 
A.2d 894, 901 (1983); see also Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 
1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1225, 1243 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. 
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 
(Ill. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742, 754 (Iowa 1982); Placek 
v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519-20 (Mich. 1979); Scott v. 
Rizzo, 634 P.3d 1234, 1242 (N.M. 1981); Bradley v. Appalachia Power Co., 
256 S.E.2d 879,885 (W. Va. 1979). 
121. Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 434. 
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judicially adopted in Florida."122 Because the court created contribu-
tory negligence, it also had the power to dispose of it. 
Since Harrison, four additional states have judicially adopted com-
parative negligence.123 These decisions have occurred even in states 
that initially deferred such a change to the legislature. One of these 
states-Missouri-was cited in Harrison, along with Alabama and Dela-
ware, as one that has held "as a matter of policy that any such change 
should be made by the legislature."124 Although this was true at the 
time of Harrison, only eight months later the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri judicially adopted comparative negligence. 125 
In Steinman v. Strobe~ 126 a case deferring abrogation to the legisla-
ture, the Supreme Court of Missouri expressed concerns similar to 
those expressed by Maryland's courts. For example, the court ob-
served that "a change from contributory negligence to comparative 
negligence encompasses much more than simply allowing plaintiffs 
who are partially at fault to recover part of their damages."127 The 
court explained that such a change included the need to examine 
other doctrines, such as contribution, indemnity, and joint and sev-
eral liability.128 The concurring opinion added that another argu-
ment in favor of legislative action is the court's inability to determine 
the most efficient form of comparative negligence.129 The concurring 
opinion further stated, "No area of the law cries out more for a clear 
policy established by democratically elected representatives."13o 
Despite such strong and definitive language in favor of legislative 
action, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Gustafson v. Benda,131 re-
placed contributory negligence with pure comparative negligence.132 
122. [d. See also Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Yniestra, 21 Fla. 700 (1886) Uudi-
cially adopting contributory negligence). 
123. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Ky. 1984); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 
S.W.2d 11, 15-16 (Mo. 1983); Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.2d 
783, 784 (S.C. 1991); McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 
1992). 
124. Hamson, 295 Md. at 456, 456 A.2d at 901 (citing Steinman v. Strobel, 589 
S.W.2d 293,294 (Mo. 1979)). 
125. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15-16. Alabama remains a contributory negligence 
state, Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45 n.27, 56, while the Delaware 
legislature has enacted a comparative negligence statute, DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, § 8132 (1999). 
126. 589 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1979). 
127. [d. at 294. 
128. [d. 
129. [d. (Welliver, j., concurring). 
130. [d. at 295 (quoting Am. Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899, 
925 (Cal. 1978)). These opinions were followed by dissenting opinions 
from Chief Justice Bardgett and Judge Donnelly, both of whom favored 
judicial action, but differed in their opinions of which form of comparative 
negligence to adopt. [d. at 295 (Bardgett, Cj., dissenting); id. at 297 (Don-
nelly, j., dissenting). 
131. 661 S.W.2d 11 (1983) (en banc). 
132. [d. at 15-16. 
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The court described the change as the logical evolution from the last 
clear chance doctrine. 133 The majority attributed its decision to a lack 
of legislative action following Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Whitehead & 
Kales CO.,134 stating that "[w]e now are past the time when we should 
have resolved the uncertainty surrounding comparative fault by ex-
panding the application of the doctrine."135 The dissent, however, 
maintained that this decision was one for the General Assembly, 136 
especially since the abrogation of contributory negligence was not 
mentioned in the briefs or pleadings of either party.137 Chief Justice 
Rendlen emphasized the ramifications of abrogating a doctrine that 
had been in existence in the state for over 100 years.138 His concerns 
included, inter alia, a large volume of litigation, including appeals.139 
These concerns were reiterated injustice Gunns's dissent.14o Despite 
these dissenting opinions, the majority's decision has not been over-
ruled, either by the courts or the legislature, to this date. 
The twelve judicially adopting states demonstrate the ability of the 
courts to successfully implement change. This trend began over thirty 
years ago in Florida and continues to be successful. Its success is most 
significant in Missouri, a state that had previously deferred such action 
to the legislature. 
3. Secondary Authority 
In addition to looking at other jurisdictions, the court in Bozman 
looked to secondary authority. The Court of Appeals found "the 
trend and, indeed, the great weight of authority, to be to move away 
from the doctrine [of interspousal immunity] and in favor of chang-
ing the common law to abolish it, either fully or partially."141 In sup-
port of its decision, the court noted the position of legal scholars and 
commentators in favor of abrogation.142 
A similar trend in authority exists with respect to contributory negli-











[d. at 13. 
566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (abandoning the concept of "active-passive neg-
ligence" in favor of "comparative fault" in multiple defendant cases). 
Gustafson, 661 S.w.2d at 15. 
See id. at 29 (Rendlen, Cj., dissenting). 
[d. at 28. 
See id. 
See id. at 29. 
See id. (Gunn,j., dissenting) ("We have pierced and circumvented the revet-
ment so carefully designed to separate, segregate, preserve and distinguish 
the identities and functions of judicial, legislative and executive 
branches.") . 
Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 488, 830 A.2d 450, 466 (2003). 
See id. at 483, 830 A.2d at 463 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 270,462 
A.2d at 519-20 (1983)). See also FOWLER V. lfARpER & FLEMINCJAMES, JR., 1 
THE LAw OF TORTS 645-46 (1956); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAw OF TORTS 862-63 (4th ed. 1971). 
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negligence. As early as 1950, scholars recognized the harshness of 
contributory negligence. For example, in Comparative Negligence on the 
March, Ernest A. Turk explained: 
[Contributory negligence] may have had its merits in the 
early days of the nineteenth century, when infant industry 
stood in need of judicial help against the ravages which 
might have been wrought by over-sympathetic juries. In an 
age where men are pitted against the power and speed of 
machines, however, the harshness of the doctrine becomes 
overwhelming. 143 
Similar attitudes concerning these doctrines have been expressed 
since then, demonstrating the overwhelming agreement among schol-
ars that the outdated doctrine of contributory negligence should be 
replaced with comparative negligence. 144 As in Bozman, such secon-
dary authority should be persuasive in the court's evaluation of these 
two doctrines. 
V. RECOGNIZING THE OBSTACLES 
As recognized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Bozman, the 
decision to abolish contributory negligence differs from the abolish-
ment of other common law doctrines. 145 The abrogation of contribu-
tory negligence involves the adoption of another doctrine that must 
be adopted in a particular form. 146 The court, however, emphasized 
its statement in Boblitz: 
{W]e have never construed the doctrine oj stare decisis to inhibit us 
from changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision 
where we find, in light oj changed conditions or increased knowledge 
that the rule has become so unsound in the circumstances 0l modern 
life, a vestige oj the past, no longer suitable to our people. 47 
Robert A. Leflar, a commentator on the subject, further identified 
the obstacles created by judicial abrogation, stating that comparative 
negligence "seems to call for the enactment of a comprehensive stat-
ute, with sections and subsections carefully worked out in advance by a 
143. See Turk, supra note 19, at 201. 
144. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 347 (1st Ed. 1974); see 
also Robert E. Keeton, Comment on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory 
Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REv. 906 (1968); 
William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REv. 465, 508 (1953). 
145. Bozman, 376 Md. at 492-93,830 A.2d at 469 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274, 
462 A.2d at 521). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 493,830 A.2d at 468 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 274,462 A.2d at 521-
22 (quoting Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 
459,456 A.2d 894, 903 (1983))). 
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legislative drafting committee aided by an advisory commission."148 
Nevertheless, the judicially acting courts have made this transition 
with ease, not concerning themselves with the different forms of com-
parative negligence. Most of these states have chosen the pure 
form. 149 
States choosing pure comparative negligence have emphasized the 
fairness of this form. In support of its decision, the Supreme Court of 
Michigan stated that the pure form best addresses the fault of both 
parties.150 The court continued by observing that "[w]hat pure com-
parative negligence does is hold a person fully responsible for his or 
her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is 
justice."151 The Supreme Court of Alaska stated that the pure form "is 
the simplest to administer and which is best calculated to bring about 
substantial justice in negligence cases."152 
A recent law review article examined which doctrine, contributory 
or comparative negligence, best achieves the goals of the tort sys-
tem. 153 It examined the three primary policy aspects of torts: deter-
rence, compensation, and corrective justice.154 The authors 
determined that comparative negligence, specifically pure compara-
tive negligence, best addresses these policy issues.155 The authors de-
fend their theory by stating that the pure form "is superior to 
modified comparative negligence in achieving tort law's compensa-
tion goal" because pure comparative negligence does not preclude a 
plaintiff from recovery.156 
The fifty percent and forty-nine percent rules are associated with 
similar criticism to that of contributory negligence. For example, the 
Supreme Court of California noted that the " , [fifty] percent' system 
simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a 
different ground."157 In other words, a jury has the opportunity to 
arbitrarily decide whether one will recover damages. With contribu-
tory negligence, the jury will decide whether to assign fault based on 
whether they think the plaintiff should recover damages. Similarly, in 
the fifty percent system, a juror distinction between a plaintiff being 











Id. at 921. Most states, however, have not adopted such comprehensive stat-
utes. Id. at 921-22. 
See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511,519 (Mich. 1979) (quot-
ing SCHWARTZ, supra note 144, at 347). 
Id. (quoting Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400, 429 (Mich. 1997)). 
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975). 
See Robinette & Sherland, supra note 9, at 45-46. 
Id. at 46. 
Id. at 50, 51, 59. 
Id. at 51. 
Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43 (Cal. 1975) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. 
REv. 1,25 (1953)). 
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cover damages. Both are all or nothing approaches, but to a different 
degree. 
Only three judicially adopting states-South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and West Virginia-adopted a modified form of comparative negli-
gence. 15S West Virginia was the first judicially abrogated state to 
choose a form other than pure comparative negligence. The court 
reasoned that it did not want to allow recovery for a plaintiff who sub-
stantially contributed to the damages. 159 Instead, the court adopted 
the forty-nine percent approach.160 
In adopting comparative negligence, the courts will have to care-
fully consider which form to adopt. Maryland's advantage, however, is 
the long line of case law and legislative history from the other forty-six 
comparative negligence states. 161 In addition, as demonstrated in 
Iowa, the legislature can later change the form decided upon by the 
courts. 162 Although this may create temporary confusion in the judi-
cial system, it allows the legislature recourse if it is not satisfied with 
the new doctrine's application to public policy. 
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
The majority of states that judicially adopted comparative negli-
gence have chosen the pure form.163 Courts have justified adoption 
of the pure form because it is more in accord with the fault-based 
system of torts. 164 The modified form, however, seems to be a better 
option for Maryland. 
158. See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. 
159. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979). 
160. Id. 
161. Chief Justice Hornsby of the Supreme Court of Alabama, which has not yet 
adopted comparative negligence, expressed a similar advantage: 
The bench and the bar in each of the jurisdictions adopting the 
doctrine of comparative negligence have proved themselves able to 
overcome the problems attendant to change; they have overcome 
those problems in order to implement a fairer system of justice. 
Our bench and bar are no less able to overcome those problems. I 
believe that our system would fairly and effectively resolve any 
problems arising out of the change to the doctrine of comparative 
negligence, as they arose. 
Williams v. Delta Int'l Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1334 (Ala. 1993) 
(Hornsby, CJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
162. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.3 (West 1998) (superseding Goetzman v. Wichern, 
327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982), by designating a modified form of compara-
tive negligence rather than the pure form). 
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (point-
ing out that" [the fifty percent] rule distorts the very principle it recognizes, 
i.e., that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault con-
tributes to an injurious result. The partial rule simply lowers, but does not 
eliminate, the bar of contributory negligence.") (quoting Friedrich K. 
Juenger, Brieffor Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of 
2004] Judicial Abolishment of Contributory Negligence 285 
The West Virginia supreme court offered convincing support for 
the modified form: 
The fundamental justification for the pure comparative neg-
ligence rule is its fairness in permitting everyone to recover 
to the extent he is not at fault. Thus, the eye of the needle is 
'no fault,' and we are asked not to think about the larger 
aspect-the camel representing 'fault.' It is difficult, on the-
oretical grounds alone, to rationalize a system which permits 
a party who is [ninety-five] percent at fault to have his day in 
court as a plaintiff because he is [five] percent fault-free. 165 
In addition to West Virginia, the two states to most recently judi-
cially adopt comparative negligence-South Carolina and Tennes-
see-chose the modified form. 166 The Supreme Court of Tennessee 
rejected the pure form of comparative fault because it theoretically 
allows people to recover even if they substantially contributed to the 
harm.167 The court instead adopted the forty-nine percent rule be-
cause it "ameliorates the harshness of the common law rule while re-
maining compatible with a fault-based tort system."168 
In deciding which form of modified comparative negligence to use, 
it is important to recognize the significance of choosing a fifty percent 
versus a forty-nine percent rule. The fifty-percent rule allows for re-
covery if the plaintiffs negligence is "not greater than" the defen-
dant's negligence, while the forty-nine percent rule allows recovery 
only if the plaintiffs negligence is "not as great as" the defendant's.169 
This difference is significant because juries commonly find that the 
parties are equally negligent.17o In such a case, therefore, recovery 
would be available only under the fifty-percent rule. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the forty-nine per-
cent rule. Adopting this form would ameliorate some of the state's 
concerns regarding comparative negligence. Since recovery can only 
occur if the plaintiffs negligence is less than fifty percent of the total 
negligence, this form would deter frivolous claims and only provide 
recovery to deserving plaintiffs who are not substantially responsible 
for the harm. 
Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson v. Construction Equip-
ment Company, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 3,50 (1972)). 
165. Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 883. 
166. See supra notes 55, 57 and accompanying text. 
167. See McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tenn. 1992). 
168. Id. 
169. See supra note 56, 58. 
170. See Prosser, supra note 144, at 494; see also Heather C. Webb, Comparative 
Negligence-McIntyre v. Balentine: Tennessee Judicially Adopts the Doctrine of 
Comparative Negligence, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 10 (1992). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Chief Judge Gilbert of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
citing Harrison, appropriately summarized Maryland's position on 
common law doctrines: 
In light of the revision of the Restatement Second of Con-
tracts and those pronouncements made by the courts of 
some of our sister states, modification might be considered 
the "modern trend." That does not mean, however, that Ma-
ryland will follow the "modern trend" parade. History dem-
onstrates that, before they join a parade as marchers, 
Maryland courts want to know where the parade is going. l71 
In the twenty years since the Court of Appeals of Maryland dele-
gated the responsibility of changing the common law to the legisla-
ture, the General Assembly has failed to act. A failure to act, however, 
is not necessarily an indication of legislative disapproval. 172 In addi-
tion, as recently demonstrated in Bozman, the court's deference to the 
legislature does not preclude the court from acting. Instead, as with 
interspousal immunity, the antiquated nature of the doctrine far out-
weighs any rationale for patiently awaiting legislative action. Compar-
ative negligence is no longer just a "modern trend." It is a necessity. 
Maryland now knows where Chief Judge Gilbert's aforementioned 
"parade" is going. Since Florida's adoption of comparative negligence 
over thirty years ago, twelve states have judicially adopted the doc-
trine. All of the states to adopt comparative negligence have done so 
with ease, even those whose judiciary acted. With this knowledge in 
hand, it is time for the court to take immediate action and join the 
parade. 
Jennifer J Karangelen 
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